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to protect against the victimization of
people who were particularly wlnerable to discrimination. R.A. v., 112S.
Ct. at 2549. The Court, reasoning that
the "emotive impact of speech on its
audience is not a secondary effect,
found that the St. Paul ordinance was
not directed to secondary effects because it handicapped "specific categories" of speech. [d. (quotiug Boos \I.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988».
In a concurring opinion, Justice
White argued that the case should have
been decided by finding the ordinance
fatally overbroad. [d. at 2550. As
written, the ordinance could prevent
modes ofexpression that had offensive
content but were not themselves threatening or harmful. For this reason,
Justice White charged the majority with
renouncing the traditional use of strict
scrutiny review as atool ofFirstAmendment analysis. Under a strict scrutiny
analysis, restrictions on speech are justified where the statute is narrowly
tailored and necessary for the achievement of a compelling interest. The St.
Paul ordinance, according to Justice
White, could have survived a strict
scrutiny review if it was more narrowly drafted. He faulted the majority
for effecting an underinclusive standard which suggested that the statute
should have banned a wider category
ofspeech than was necessary to achieve
the city's interest. This perceived departure from strict scrutiny analysis
was criticized in light of the recent
Supreme Court decision Burson \I.
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), in
which the participating members of
the present Court agreed that a strict
scrutiny standard is applicable to a
case involving a First Amendmentchallenge to acontent-based statute. R.A. V. ,
112 S. Ct. at 2551.
The concurrence also argued that
the majority violated Court precedent
by not categorically including fighting
words among constitutionally prohibited speech. [d. at 2552-53. Justice
White recognized that fighting words
made up no "essential part ofany exposition of ideas" and were wholly un-

protected by the FirSt Amendment because they were "directed at individuals to provoke violence or to inflict
injury." [d. at 2553 (quoting
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
In a separate concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens noted his frustration
with the majority's attitude towards
the dangers of hate speech. R.A. V., 112
S. Ct. at 2570. In a footnote referring
to the Los Angeles riots, he wrote,
"one need look no further than the
recent social unrest in the nation's cities to see that race-based threats may
cause more harm to society ... than
other threats." [d. at 2570 n.9.
The Supreme Court's ruling that
banning cross burnings and swastika
displays on the basis of content violates the First Amendment is significant because most states have enacted
some form of hate speech legislation
that will be invalidated by this decision. R.A. V. \I. St. Paul will probably
stand as one of the most far-reaching
interpretations of the First Amendment. Although the bottom line was
balanced, the analysis was insensitive.
The majority's seeming perception of
hate speech as no more than a societal
nuisance is offensive to the many
Americans whose lives were threatened by the very actions which the
majority characterizes as merely "obnoxious." To many, the sight of a
burning cross on the front lawn or a
swastika display on the temple wall
exceeds mere speech and proposes a
direct threat of physical violence.
Moreover, the Court's fractured consensus on First Amendment analysis,
as applied to hate speech, will likely
leave many lawyers bewildered over
how to litigate hate crimes, and will
leave many legislators perplexed about
how to formulate a hate crime statute.

Lucas\l. South Carolina Coastal Council: LANDOWNER COMPENSATIONREQUIRED WIIEREPROPERTY REGULATIONS DEPRIVE
ALLECONONUCALLYBENEnCIAL USE OF LAND UNLESS
REGULATIONS ARE INHERENT
IN TITLE.
The United States Supreme Court's
most recent inverse condemnation de-

cision,Lucas \I. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), intro-

duced a new approach to determine
whether a property owner has suffered
a regulatory taking requiring the payment ofjust compensation. The Court
developed a test which inquires into
the underlying principles ofthe state's
property and nuisance law. The new
test considers whether the challenged
regulations merely make explicit restrictions on the property's use that
were inherent in the title to the property
itself. If so, then no compensation is
required under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, even if the regulation
deprives the owner ofall economically
beneficial use of the land.
In 1986, David Lucas purchased
two residential lots on the Isle ofpalms,
a barrier island located east of Charleston, South Carolina. Just as neighboring landowners had done on their land,
Lucas intended to build single-family
homes on his $975,000 parcels. His
plans, however, were thwarted by the
South Carolina Legislature in 1988
with the passage of the Beachfront
Management Act. S.C. Code Ann. §§
48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1991) (''the Act"). The Act established
a baseline connecting the furthest-inland points of erosion during the last
forty years and prohibited the construction of "occupiable improvements" seaward of the baseline. Be- Kim Germaine Judd cause the baseline fell inland ofLucas' s
lots and his proposed homes constituted "occupiable improvements."
Lucas was prohibited from building on
his land.
Lucas challenged the Act in the
South Carolina Court of Common
Pleas, arguing that the law's effect on
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his property constituted a taking without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Lucas, 112 S. O. at 2890. The trial
court agreed and reasoned that Lucas
must be compensated because there
were virtually no restrictions on the
use of the land when Lucas purchased
it. Id. ,The court thus found that the Act
deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots, interfered with
the unrestricted right of use, and rendered the lots valueless. Id The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding itself bound by the legislature's
conclusion that coastal zone construction threatened South Carolina's
beaches, a valuable public resource.
Regulations designed to prevent such
public harms, the court ruled, do not
require compensation despite their effect upon property value.
The United States Supreme Court
began its analysis by addressing a ripeness issue raised by the South Carolina
Coastal Council. After argument but
before the South Carolina Supreme
Court had rendered its opinion, the Act
was amended to allow the Council to
issue "special permits" for the construction or reconstruction ofhabitable
structures seaward ofthe baseline. Id.
at 2891. Because the South Carolina
Supreme Court declined to base its
decision on ripeness grounds, the Supreme Court found it appropriate to
address the case on its merits, rather
than ordering that Lucas pursue relief
by obtaining special permits. Id.
The Court then traced a brief history of its takings cases, noting that
this rubric had fostered few clear rules
and numerous exceptions. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922), had acknowledged that a
'''regulation [that] goes too far ... will
be recognized as a taking.... Lucas,
112 S. O. at 2893 (quoting Mahon,
260 U.S. at 415). The problem with
this recognition, the Court explained,
was that the phrase ''too far" had never
been adequately defined, necessitating
acase-by-case factual analysis that produced inconsistent decisions. Id. Two
20

categories of regulatory action did not
require this fact-specific inquiry, however, but instead warranted compensation regardless of the public interest
advanced. Id The first category involvedthoseregulations that compelled
the owner to suffer a physical invasion
of his land, and the second involved
regulations that denied the landowner
all economically beneficial or productive use of the land. Id. The Court
concluded that a regulation which requires an owner to "leave his property
economically idle" effects a
compensable taking. Id at 2895.
The Court noted that because Lucas
had not challenged either the Act's
pwposes or its means, the South Carolina Supreme Court had considered his
claim governed by the United States
Supreme Court's long history of Due
Process and Takings Clause challenges.
/d at 2896-97. This line of cases
indicated that the state's police power
to enjoin landowners from activities
akin to public nuisances was constitotionallypennissible. /d at2897. While
acknowledging that many of these
cases suggested that "harmful or noxious uses" of property could be prevented by government regulation without requiring compensation, the Court
stated that the South Carolina Supreme
Court erred in mechanically applying
that principle to Lucas's case. /d.
The Court explained that its "harmful or noxious use" analysis was simply the predecessor to its laterrecognition that regulations which substantially advance legitimate state interests
are not takings. /d. However, the
Court elaborated that "noxious-use
logic" could not serve as the basis by
which to distinguish regulatory takings requiring compensation from those
which do not. /d at 2899. The Court
explained that the prevention ofa noxious use was simply the early manifestation of the police power justification
necessary to sustain, without compensation, any regulatory reduction in
value. /d. at 2898-99. Additionally,
the Court noted that drawing the distinction between regulations which

prevent harmful uses and those which
confer benefits is a "difficult, if not
impossible" task. Id at 2899.
After detailing the inadequacy of
noxious-use analysis, the Court introduced a new takings test that looks to
the "nature of the owner's estate" to
see if ''the proscribed use interests
were not part ofhis title to begin with."
Id Ifthe proscribed use was not inherent in the landowner's title, compensation is not required even if the regulation deprives the landowner ofall ec0nomically beneficial use of his land.
Id. The test therefore asks whether
government regulation simply makes
manifest limitations on the landowner'S
rights that were included in the title to
the land. /d.
This new approach was buttressed
as being a derivative ofthe ''bundle of
rights" concept, because landowners
would naturally expect their land to be
subject to some level ofregulation. /d
at 2899-2900. The new test, the Court
explained, recognizes that an
uncompensated regulatory taking could
not be newly asserted by the government unless it was an outgrowth of a
pre-existing limitation on the owner's
title. /d. at 2900. The Court explained
that such a regulation would merely
mimic the result that adjacent landowners could achieve in court based on
the State's nuisance law. /d The
Court illustrated this principle through
the example of a lakebed owner who
was denied a permit to fill in the lake
and thereby flood others' land. /d. The
lakebed owner would not be entitled to
compensation because this limitation
on his use is inherent in the title he
holds. /d
The Court further explained that
the ''total taking" inquiry required by
the new test ordinarily would entail
examination of several factors relative
to the landowner claim ing a taking. /d.
at 290 1. Among these are the degree of
harm posed by the claimant's activities, the social value ofthe activities,
their suitability to the location, and the
feasibility of avoiding any alleged
harm. /d.
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Applying this test to Lucas's case,
the Court found it unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented Lucas from building on his
land, but left judgment on the issue to
the South Carolina Supreme Court on
remand. Id TheSouthCaroIinaCoastal
Council's burden on remand, the Court
noted, is to "identify background principles of nuisance and property law
that prohibit the uses [Lucas] now intends in the circumstances in which the
property is presently found." Id at
2901-02. Only by sustaining this burden could the State contend that the
Beachfront Management Act's proscription ofall such beneficial uses did
not amount to a taking. Id. at 2902.
With the development of a new test
for regulatory takings in Lucas, the
Supreme Court did not wholly reject
its earlier analyses ofpublic nuisances,
legitimate state interests, or economically viable uses ofprivate land. Rather,
the Lucas test mandates an antecedent
examination of state property and nuisance law to determine whether regulations on land use effect a taking requiring compensation ofthe landowner.
Lower courts may have difficulty
implementing the Lucas test, however,
because the Court outlined the test in
broad terms and did not provide specific guidelines. Consequently, potentialland purchasers must exercise caution and determine if property is subject to implied limitations on its use.
- Joshua D. Bruch
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools: DAMAGES ARE AVAILABLE FOR AN ACTION
BROUGHT TO ENFORCE TITLE
IX OF THE EDUCATION
AMENDMENTS OF 1972.
In a recent unanimous decision, the

United States Supreme Court held that
federal courts have the authority to
award appropriate remedies in actions
brought pursuant to Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 (Title
IX). Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992). In so
holding, the Court maintained the gen-

eral principle that absent a clear indication by Congress to the contrary, federal courts have the power to award
appropriate relief in cases brought under a federal statute.
Petitioner, Christine Franklin, was
a student at North Gwinnett High
School in Georgia. Respondent,
Gwinnett County School District, operated the school with federal funds.
On December 29, 1988, Franklin filed
a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, alleging that she had been a
victim ofsexual harassment and abuse
by a teacher, Andrew Hill. She sought
damages pursuant to Title IX, which
provides in part that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." Id. at 1031 n.l
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988».
Subsequent to Franklin filing the complaint, Hill resigned from his position
at North Gwinnett High School on the
condition that all pending matters and
investigations be dropped. The school
closed its investigation.
The district court dismissed
Franklin's complaint, holding that Title
IX does not provide for an award of
damages. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Noting that Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 and
Title VI ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964
have been interpreted similarly, the
appellate court relied on Drayden v.
Needville Indep. Sck Dist., 642 F.2d
129 (5th Cir. 1981), which held that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not provide for an award of damages, as its
authority for not granting damages
under Title IX. The court further reasoned that damages were limited under
statutes that were enacted pursuant to
Congress's Spending Clause power.
Because Title IX was enacted under
the spending clause without an express
provision for damages, the court held
that damages were unavailable. The

United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to settle the conflicting decisions among the circuit courts on the
issue of whether the implied right of
action underTitie IX authorizes a claim
for damages.
In an opinion delivered by Justice
White, the Supreme Court first acknowledged the general rule that
''where legal rights have been invaded
and a federal statute provides for a
general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done."
Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1033 (quoting
Bel/v. Hood, 327U.S. 678, 684(1946».
The Court also recognized that affording a remedy for wrongs was deeply
rooted in American history and in support thereof quoted Chief Justice
Marshall's declaration that our govemment"bas been emphatically termed
a government oflaws, and not of men.
It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation, ifthe laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested
legal right." Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at
1033 (quoting Marbury v. Madison,S
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1908».
In arguing that damages should not
be provided under Title IX, Respondents and the United States as amicus
curiae insisted that the presumption in
favor ofdamages no longer existed aDd
emphasized that both the statute and
the legislative intent behind the statute
were silent as to damages. Franklin,
112 S. Ct. at 1034. Respondents contended that regardless ofthe presumption that existed traditionally or at the
time Bell was decided, Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) nullified the presumption by holding that
''the question of who may enforce a
statutory right is fundamentally different from the question of who may
enforce a right that is protected by the
Constitution." Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at
1034 (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 241).
In rejecting this contention, the Court
held that Davis dealt with whether one
had a cause ofaction, not with whether
one was entitled to any relief under a
particular cause of action. Franklin,
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